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The Historical Roots of Public 
Diplomacy and Their Significance for 
Australia and India1 
David Lowe 
At a time of ambitious, almost frightening plans· for public 
diplomacy initiatives-consider, for example, the Chinese target 
for 1,000 overseas Confucius Institutes by the year 2020-it is easy 
to get caught up in a feeling of change without precedent in the 
pursuit of national interests overseas. In the spirit of debate and 
panel discussion, it is timely to look back as well as anticipate the 
future, not merely an academic exercise to explore the historical 
roots of public diplomacy; but in a way that makes for better 
decision-making in where to go next. This is the case for a possible 
"superpower," India, whose emergence in international relations 
is ac<;ompanied by significant ventures in what is referred to as 
"new" public diplomacy. The "new'' refers both to the broadening 
of agents at work-public diplomacy now embracing relationships 
between civil society actors overseas, and encouraging constant 
contact between non-government actors-and it sometimes 
1 This chapter. is a modified version of a chapter appearing in India: 
Reluctant Superpower?, ed. Amitabh Mattoo, Melbourne: Melbourne UP, 
2012. 
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also refers to the_ greater use of social media and instant 
~communications in messages sent and received. 
While thinking about the new, there are good reasons for 
recalling the old. There are three main strands of historical 
lineage informing the idea of public diplomacy (referred to as 
PD hereafter). Furthermore, they are not merely remote origins 
from which the phenomenon has grown but they remain close to 
the surface of current policy formulation and implementation in 
relation to PD, and therefore warrant remembering. These three 
strands are: 19th century adventures between state and non-state 
actors, the rise of 20th century state-promoted propaganda, and 
the emergence of internationalism, as one of the most enduring 
bedrocks upon which new forms of diplomacy can be launched .. 
And in addition to these three strands of lineage, there are two 
further historical dimensions to the phenomenon that are only 
half-appreciated. The first of the half-appreciated .is the role of 
history as a guide for decision-makers choosing between what 
works and what does not; and the other is the need for I would 
call a historical sensibility to accompany modern thinking about 
the slippery concept of national reputation. 
In putting this case, I take a generous view of PD as addressing 
a broad audience as a means of persuading others to want the same 
outcomes as you want. American commentator Bruce Gregory's 
elaboration seems about right. He reminds us of the action and 
agency in public diplomacy-the key verbs at work for state actors, 
he argues, are understanding cultures, attitudes and behaviour; 
building and managing relationships; and influencing opinions 
and actions to advance interests and values. 2 I would add two 
2 Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," Annals 
of the American Academy ofPolitica1 and Social Science 616 (2008), pp. 274-
90. 
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further qualities. The first is that the means of persuasion needs to 
be either originating from government v: at least acknowledged, 
and somehow endorsed, by government; and the second is that 
PD logically involves listening, in order to. understand others, and 
respond accordingly. My perspective is that of an international 
historian, and my argument below is international as much as 
Indian or Australian in focus. 
The first strand of historical lineage logically informing PD 
prevailed for most of the 19th century, and featured shifting and 
loose relationships between nation states and non-state agencies 
shepherding national interests in cultur~l transmissions overseas. 
It has been suggested that the 21st century multi-dimensional 
mix of state and non-state forces involved in PD is something 
of a return to earlier times, after an unusually state-centralised 
phase generated by the Second World War and then the Cold War. 
European examples of engagement with the Unit~d States are 
especially instructive. In France, the Alliance Fran<;aise, founded 
in 1883, promoted French language and culture, and prize-winning 
French artists found themselves on sponsored tours to the United 
States at a time when popular opinion there was mostly hostile to 
the French. Similarly, German composers were at the forefront of 
the Germans 1 successful efforts around the turn of the century to 
educate overseas and especially US audiences in classical music. 
It was notable that, as was the case with Alliance Franftaise, the 
state--the Reich government in Germany's case-stayed at arms 
length fron1 these cultural missions. The same was the case with 
stirring academic exchange programs (the Rhodes scholarships, 
for example) and European business groups setting up co-
operative societies with like-minded groups in trading nations. 
Colourful individuals could transcend colonial circumstances, as 
was the case with Bengali seer Swami Vivekananda, who turned 
41 Enriched Relations 
up uninvited to the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 
1893, and became de facto the Indian representative. An inspiring 
speaker, he brought Hinduism into popular consciousness, at the 
same time sketching its international reach in a way that captured 
diasporas and smoothed over divisions, and also harnessing it to 
the cause of Indian nationalists. As a conference gate-crasher, 
he did much to awaken the West to a Hindu spirituality that also 
harboured a morally superior form of nationalism. 3 
Whether or not the state liked these developments-and they 
were sometimes regarded with suspicion. or disdain by foreign 
offices and embassies....:.does not detract from their. significance 
and success. In all cases mentioned, the State eventually caught 
up with these private initiatives, conferring acknowledgement or 
endorsement. In short, those who see the end of the Cold War as 
unlocking features of the international environment that were 
kept in tight check for longer than anticipated might be able to 
. draw on the recent resurgence of a less state-dominated idea of 
PD in evidence of their ideas. Stretching the argument, we might 
say that private agents and public private partnerships in nation 
branding or PD have their historical antecedents as much in the 
nineteenth as in the late twentieth or early 21st century. 4 
The second strand nf lineage is the story of propaganda and 
the bureaucracy supporting it during the first 60-odd years of the 
20th century-a period in which war-inspired ideals and modern 
3 C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914, Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004, pp. 240-42. 
4 This is a summary of the argument put by Jessica c. E. Gienow-Hecht, 
~'The Anomaly of the Cold War: Cultural Diplomacy and Civil Society 
since 1950/' The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in 
Cultural and International History, ed. K. A. Osgood and B. C. Etheridge, 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, pp. 29-56. 
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bureaucracies added a new sense of propaganda grown by and 
harnessed to a burgeoning national security state. While the term 
''propaganda" carries some negative connotations, it also has a 
close relationship with PD, especially when we recall firstly that 
EdmWld Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts, widely 
regarded father of public diplomacy, said that he would have been 
comfortable with term propaganda as something that covered his 
interest, but, due to propaganda's pejorative implications, was 
forced to search for a more neutral umbrella term. 5 Others took a 
little longer to make the shift and it was only in the 1970s that the 
US government's information activities made the terminological 
shift to PD, and left behind the previously well-used umbrella 
term of propaganda. 6 The pejorative feel of other terms such 
as information warfare, psychological opera~ions, information 
campaigns-terms that have become common since the Second. 
World War-can obscure a basic aim shared with PD. They are 
dimensions of a nation's attempt to cultivate public opinion to. 
achieve that nation's aims, or put in a way that the advocates 
of 'soft power' would like, they are one form of persuasion 
orchestrated in national interests. 
There are, in fact, some strong roots to the state-centred 
propaganda generation that predate the Second World War. 
Towards the end of the First World War a mix of revulsion at the 
horrors of war and excitement about communications advances 
in radio, telegraph, the press fed also into US President Woodrow 
5 K. A. Osgood and B. C. Etheridge, '~he New International History Meets 
the New Cultural History: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Relations," 
The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and 
International History, ed. K. A. Osgood and B. C. Etheridge, Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 12. 
6 Gregory, op. cit., p. 275. 
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Wilson's liberal ideas about the rule of international law and self-
determination for a better, more morally-based world order. 
From the non-state world, new and very active educational 
and philanthropic foundations (such as the Rockefeller and 
the Guggenheim) forced the Americans to adapt and to try to 
manage the new overseas initiatives that stemmed from sources 
other than Washington. From such developments come the first 
exercises in what commentators call "cultural diplomacyi' and 
from this era comes the stirrings of liberal internationalism, 
which is a theme warranting separate attention. But Woodrow 
Wilson's new Committee on Public Information, 1917-19, was 
also an extraordinarily successful propaganda campaign towards 
public support for US participation in the war, involving close to 
150,000 workers in various message making and disseminating 
activities.7 
Just as international affairs during the first half of the 20th 
century were dominated by two world wars, it was war-generated 
bureaucracy that enabled the growth of very big propaganda 
machines, especially during the Second World War. In simple 
terms, the war called for concerted efforts in the production 
of politically strong messages closely linked to the -aims of key 
combatants, and these settings changed only slowly in the postwar 
years, partly because a new war, the Cold War, quickly replaced the 
last one, and partly because it would take time for new modalities 
and greater subtlety to grow.8 In 1959, for example, William 
Benton, former US assistant secretary of state, reflected on the 
7 Stephen Vaughn, "First Amendment Liberties and the Committee on 
Public Information," The American journal of Legal History 23.2 (April 
1979), pp. 95-119. 
8 J. M. Lee, "British cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War: 1946-61/' 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 9.1 (March 1998), pp. 112-34. 
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recent reciprocating art exhibitions held in Moscow and Ne'w 
York under a US-USSR cultural exchange agreement. The US State 
Department, he wrote, was in the propaganda business. . .. The 
State Department will always be in the propaganda business and 
will never be in the art business. "Art" judged from the standpoint 
of the US Government and its Congressional appropriations, 
applied to overseas activities, must always be judged from its 
impact as propaganda-and never from its impact as art.9 
Such comments do little to divest propaganda of its pejorative 
connotations. Benton was, of course, a Cold War Warrior. His 
view exemplifies the state's heavy-handed and manipulative 
information campaigns of the Cold War. 
Before the Cold WarJ the appallingly successful work of joseph 
Goebbels in Nazi Germany is particularly well-remembered. But, 
when stripped of its pejorative connotation, the links between state-
directed propaganda and recent state efforts in PD are s"ignificant. 
Information generated by the state for consumption by those whose 
interests the state wishes to help shape can be imaginative and 
nuanced but it is seldom innocent. According to our definitions, the 
main difference lies in the two-way nature ofPD, the listening aspect 
implicit in Bruce Gregory's definition. If we were always certain 
that PD initiatives carried with them an unwavering commitment 
to listen, to be very responsive to feedback, then perhaps they could 
escape the vestiges of propaganda; but as it is very hard to claim 
this for all actions that go under the heading of PD, and as assessing 
the effectiveness of PD according to responses is patchy and work 
in progress, the connection with propaganda is hard to shake 
completely-even if there is a general aversion to the use of the term. 
9. Qtd. in Marilyn S. Kushner, uExhibiting Art at the American National 
Exhibition in Moscow, 1959: Domestic Politics and Cultural Diplomacy," 
journal o{Cold War Studies 4.1 (Winter 2002), p. 6. 
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' The third historical strand to current-day PD strand is the growth 
of internationalism, both at State and non-State levels, during the last 
century and early years of this one. At the supranational level, the 
growth of the Unit~d .Nations membership and UN auxiliary bodies 
from the late 1940s through 1960s· presented big, well-structured, 
opportunities for PD. The timing of this blossoming coincided with 
India's emergence as an independent state. Early ventures in post-
independence Indian PD, were less bilateral than in the supranational 
context of the UN. Through the principles and ideals they championed, 
nations of the Non-Aligned Movement stirring in the mid-1950s, 
with Nehru as one of the founding fathers, reinforced the Charter's 
aims and promoted the further development of an international 
community. As is well-known, Indian hopes for the UN were closely 
entwined with hopes for post-colonial India itself, and for humanity 
more generally. Gandhi's Quit India Declaration in Bombay in 1942 
stressed that India's nationalism spelt internationalism, foreseeing 
the need for independent India to join a world federation of free 
nations that would ensure disarmament, general peace and security, 
address the problems of injustice and inequalities, and prevent 
aggression and exploitation of others. jawaharlal Nehru's subsequent 
declarations and writings extended these ideas, especially during the 
first decade of the UN, to 1956. Other Indians helped, including the 
impossibl~-to-forget Krishna Menon, and Nehru's sister Vijaya Laxmi 
Pandit, who headed the Indian delegation to the United Nations, 
and who was the first woman to be elected President of the General 
Assembly in 1953. There was also lndia's Representative to the UN. 
Commission on Human Rights, Hansa Mehta, who was at the time 
a member of India's Constituent Assembly. This js not the place to 
re-examine the detail of Nehruvian hopes for "one worldism," for 
world government coilectivism to eventually replace nation-states, 
and for the UN to become the "conscience of the world." My main 
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purpose is to recall that this was very public, broad-based diplomacy 
aimed at mobilising public opinion in a number of nations. One recent 
reappraisal of this period suggests that we see it as one of the "co-
mingling or intermingling" of ideas about post-colonial India and 
about the post-colonial world orderj terminology that is less loaded 
wit_h morality and identity, and which is useful for building bridges 
with current debates.10 
The Assembly debates quickly took on a public affairs dimension, 
especially as the Non-Aligned movement grew more organised and 
bold from the ~id-1950s through the 1960s. The famous Resolution 
1514 in 1960, requiring the granting of immediate independence 
to colonial countries and peoples was notable for more than its 
sweeping aside previous Assemblies' acquiescence in colonial 
powers waiting for social, economic and educatior1al preparedness 
before conferring independence. It was also a moment of huge 
Non-Alignment and (then) Third World solidarity. The. issue of 
decolonisation stayed to the fore of the General Assembly debates, 
and the resolution was revisited throughout the 1960s. Significantly, 
too there was, in the wake ofResolution 1514 a successful mobilisation 
of the UN's information bureaucracy-the UN Department ofPublic 
Information. This department became a focal point for Non-Aligned 
and Group of 77 seized of the nexus be~een infortnation and power, 
and keen to direct messages of incomplete development and social 
and economic injustices at the "North."11 Similarly, the growth in 
10 See Manu Bhagavan, "A New Hope: India, the United Nations and the 
Making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights/' Modern .-'\sian 
Studi~ 44.2 (2010): pp. 311-47. 
11 Seth Centre, "Supranational Public Diplomacy: The Evolution of the 
UN Department of Public Information and the Rise of Third World 
Advocacy.'' The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in 
Cultural and International History, ed. K. A. Osgood and B. C. Etheridge, 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, pp. 135-63. 
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UNESCO activity provided for publicly-known reform agendas that 
mapped easily on to Nehru's humanism and optimisn1. 12 
Even without Nehru and without supranationalism, when 
we read the history of international relations by measures other 
than military power, strategy, alliances and mobilising for war, 
it enables the cultural, educational, social and other networks 
informing relationships to come to the fore. This is what is 
sometimes referred to as "cultural internationalism," and it offers 
a means of understanding international relations that we have 
sometimes overlooked.13 As another example, in which India also 
has a strong presence, it is worth recalling the post-war Colombo 
Plan for aid to South and Southeast Asia, a Commonwealth and 
then broader-based exercise in aid and education exchange. The 
Colombo Plan was a very worthy umbrella S<:heme under which a 
series ofbilateral aid arrangements operated. As with many other 
aid initiatives, its impact was sometimes countered by fluctuations 
in commodity prices and by trade protection, but it generated a 
lot of human-interest stories. 
The Colombo Plan became dependent on the generation of 
information for its success, and it is instructive to tease out a little 
of the PD detail that emerged. In practice, information generation 
was in the hands of a small but highly industrious group of officials. 
They included Indians who served as Information Officers, R. K. 
Chatterjee and B. L. Sharma, and India's Government Registrar of 
Newspapers, M. L. Bhardwaj, who took every opportunity to spread 
messages of aid, endeavour, growth and identity. A small Colombo 
12 for a contemporary's view, see, K. B. Lall, 'jawaharlal Nehru and the 
UNESCo,'• Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years, ed. B. R. Nanda, Delhi: 
Vikas Publishing, 1976, pp. 208-27. 
13 See, generally, Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism cmd World Order, 
Baltimore: johns Hopkins UP, 1997. 
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Plan Information Unit was created in 1953-54, and by 1958 it had 
merged with the Bureau for Technical Co-operation, that side of 
the plan focusing on education, training and technical expertise. 
In gathering stories and photos for use in journals and pamphlets, 
the Bureau more than made up for the lack of a permanent 
secretariat.14 In 1957, the regular meeting of members of the 
Colombo Plan's Consultative Committee confirmed something 
of a new era in information activity. The meeting featured 
strong consensus that members should do more to disseminate 
information about the plan through established information 
media-the press, radio and, where possible, television.15 Delegates 
at the conference agreed that new economic development and 
training efforts should be accompanied by bold new measures 
to carry the good word about the plan's projects further, both 
at home and overseas. Information was reified by members; and 
it became crucial to a broader-based acceptance among peoples 
of both donor and recipient nations, of the transformation of 
the Colombo Plan from post-war experiment to longer-term 
partnerships between the so-called uold Commonwealth, nations, 
Japan and the United States, on the one hand, and developing 
nations of South and Southeast Asia (noting that some countries 
were both donors and beneficiaries of aid) .. · 
14 Press Communique, Secretariat of Consultative Committee, New Delhi, 
17 October 1953, and undated Indian paper, uA Scheme for Setting up 
an Information Organisation of the Colombo Plan to be Considered at 
the Next Meeting of the Consultative Committee," EAl W2619 item 
118/8/11, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
15 The Colombo Plan Conference of National Information Officers, 
Singapore, 9-12 September. 1958, Summaries of Proceedings, Texts of 
Speeches and Messages, and Conference Papers, Colombo Plan Bureau 
1958, CRS A6895 item N58/137, NAA, pp. 95-7. 
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One immediate outcome was the mobilisation of a new multi-
national group of cultural ambassadors, the National Information 
Officers of participating countries. Like India, Australia was 
prominent in occupying offices central to the information drive. 
Australia's successful involvement in the Colombo Plan in an 
era before the end of uWhite Australia" involved its inscription 
in the memories of most Australians as a "worthy cause,, even 
if sometimes coloured by patronizing views of change in Asia. 
The strongest feature of Australian aid under the Colombo Plan 
consisted of scholarships and traineeships for Asian students 
to study in Australia (and live in Australian homes and new · 
international houses at universities) before returning home. 
Australian involvement also owed much to the growth of an 
information bureaucracy born in the Second World War, and 
transformed in the 1950s and 1960s into one partly preoccupied 
with the Cold War but also one tasked with generating positive 
images about immigration as a vital stage of Australia's postwar 
development, and images designed to build bridges of cautious 
engagement with the elites of postcolonial Asia. Again, it was 
not an innocent medium for messages about Asia-the work of 
Australia's post-war Australian News and Information Bureau still 
bore traces of propaganda efforts inspired by wars hot and cold-
but it was an important one.16 
Thus, the phe~omenon of wielding a new information 
bureaucracy was most important to those newly independent 
nations, including India, looking to project messages. Newly 
16 See David Lowe, "The Colombo Plan and 'Soft' Regionalism in the Asia-
Pacific: Australian and New Zealand Cultural Diplomacy in the 1950s 
and 1906s," Alfred Deakin Research Institute Working Paper No. 1, Geelong: 
ADRI: 2010; and Daniel Oakman, Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan, 
Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2004. 
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independent nations might not have inherited a war-bred 
propaganda bureaucracy but they quickly realised the importance 
of generating messages- for broad audiences. Building arguments 
around the growth of bureaucracies may not always be exciting as 
new public diplomacy ad the age of twitter; but as most forms of 
diplomacy are fundamentally about the management of change, 
so do our arguments about what is new and distinctive about 
PD need to embrace the growth and changes in bureaucracies 
supporting diplomacy. 
There are two further uses of history in whatever happens 
today, one instrumental and the other more rhetorical, and both 
useful in anchoring PD, a concept that can be over-used and 
over-burdened with expectations. We are today experiencing a 
rise in diplomatic activity that coincides with a strong sense of 
transition in the global system (or systems) wrought by financial 
crises of unpredictable timing and duration, acts and recurring 
threats of terrorism, significant power shifts, especially in Asia 
and the Pacific, and implied levels of policy co-ordination on 
unprecedented scale across and within nations in tackling the 
challenges of climate change. Not surprisingly, in this context, 
public diplomacy, as a concept, is bound to be over-used and carry 
too many hopes at times. 
Thus, the first, more pragmatic use of history, is as a provider 
oflessons. Others have begun this task. Historian-public diplomacy 
expert Nick Cull has started to compile historical case studies in 
public diplomacy, lessons of what worked and what did not, and 
he calls for more, so that we end up with a "Public Diplomacy 
Playbook" as a next-phase capacity builder.17 For an example of 
' 
17 Nicholas ] . Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, Los Angeles: 
figeuroa P, 2009. ~ 
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one exercise that did not work, the ·us Shared Values campaign 
of 2001/2, in the wake of 9/11 addressed the wrong problem. 
Millions of dollars were spent on showing to the Arab world that 
Arab-Americans lived well in a land that was tolerant and strong 
on family value~. The, trouble was, the Arab world saw the US 
more according to actions in the Middle East than according to 
domestic conditions, and therefore did not change their views. 
This was after initial market testing yielded understandably 
positive feedback for the message in the campaign.18 Cull's case-
book contains success stories, too, and invites additions. 
At a more rhetorical level, it is especially easy for political 
leaders to convey messages, based on a sense of history, that can 
enhance or detract from their nation's standing among others. 
History has a tendency to appear in politicians' speech in crisis-
like moments. There is now considerable literature on the power 
of historical metaphors to influence policy-makers under stress; 
or lessons that we supposedly learn from previous episodes. Wars 
tend to be remembered, at least in their early stages, according to 
memories of the last wars that people were involved in. 
You do not have to be particularly beholden to psychological 
explanations in order to assume that people who either lived 
through the times or who were growing up "learning the lessons, 
and being exposed to this form of popular history were likely 
to be affected. The Second World War has a particularly strong 
hold on the American imagination, as was shown by the repeated 
references to Pearl Harbor after the 9/11 attack in 2001. Later, 
in August 2007, in a less crisis-like moment, President Bush even 
attempted to draw a historical line between US involvement in the 
· post-war reconstruction of japan after 1945, and the on-going war 
18 Nicholas). Cull, op. cit., p. 43. 
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in Iraq. Bush likened Al-Qaeda's attacks on the US and its allies 
to those of japan in the Second World War and then reminded 
listeners of opposition to US-led rebuilding of the japanese 
economy (successfully) after the war, inviting them to view the US 
occupation of Iraq in the same terms. Bush omitted the Cold War 
context in which japan was restored as bulwark against the Soviet 
Union and China. His selective and mangled efforts were rightly 
criticised by historians of post-war Japan such as john Dower .19 
And the other reason for historical perspective is the value 
of history as compelling narrative with the longer view, and 
power to evoke. Effective story-telling that is linked to felt 
and demonstrated truths is, after all, one of the most powerful 
means of persuasion or reinforcing a message. Well-known 
stories or histories tend to shape national reputation, and the 
best-known stories leave lasting impressions. The motto of 
one of the biggest and best-known information services, the 
US Information Agency, was uTelling America's Story to the 
World.u As Dutch, commentator Jan Melissen suggests, public 
diplomacy, when practised effectively, runs at different speeds 
from the more traditional forms of diplomacy and often has the 
medium to longer term view in sight. Interestingly, Melissen is an 
authority on "New Public Diplomacy. "20 He suggests that public 
diplomacy should ideally be in tune with a country's medium-
term foreign policy objectives and long-term aims. It builds on 
trust and credibility and often works best with the long-term 
19 john J. Dower, uA Warning from History: Don't Expect Democracy 
in Iraq," Boston Review February-March 2003, 2 August 2010 <http:// 
bostonreview .net/BR28.1/ dower .html>. 
20 See jan Melissen, uwilding Soft Power. The New Public Diplomacy," 
. Clingettdael Diplomacy Pape-rs No.2,· Leiden: Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, 2005. 
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horizon. In the nearer term, he suggests, it is "realistic to aspire 
to influencing the milieu factors that constitute the psychological 
and political environment in which attitudes and policies towards 
other countries are debated. "21 
. 
In broad terms, political leaders have shown a preparedness 
to engage with audiences through a dialogue informed by history. 
The nature of political speech is itself profoundly influenced, 
explicitly and otherwise, by the competing meanings to be drawn 
from history. In the appeal to "thresholds," "turning points" and 
"unique opportunities" a sense of history is inevitably invoked. 
unq,erpinning all such debates is a sense that history can 
frame and provide authority to politicians' efforts to mobilise 
public support. This has been recognized in Australia. Five years 
ago, the participants in the August 2006 Australian History Summit 
investigating the teaching of history in secondary schools agreed 
that knowledge of Australian history was vital for young Australians, 
and concluded: "Nearly all of the crucial public debates embody and 
appeal to history. "22 Here is acknowledgement that history has had 
persuasive, mobilizing appeal in Australian politics. 
This, in turn, begs important questions: Is this what people 
vote for? Do they respond to certain persuasive ideals, ideas and 
feelings in ways that go well beyond carefully calculating self-
interest? Are they interested in a nation's standing in international 
affairs? Are they concerned with more than who will give them a 
better deal according to taxation and opportunity, and security at 
home and abroad? 
21 jan Melissen, op. cit., p. 12. 
22 The Hon.Julie Bishop MP, Media Release, The Australian History Summit, 
17 August 2006, 28 November 2006 <http://www .dest.gov .au/Ministers/ 
Media/Bishop/ 2006/08 /b002170806.asp>. 
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American linguist George Lakoff, in his wonderfully titled little 
book, Don't Think of an Elephant, answers with cautious "yes" to 
these questions. In the US an academic cottage industry has grown 
up around the tendency for voters to behave outside the norms of 
rational, self-interested behavi9ur. An example that Lakoff uses is 
the 2003 race for Governor of California. Focus groups monitoring 
the campaigns kept finding that voters would respond to a series of 
questions by identifying that Dehl.ocrat Gray Davis's policies were 
most closely aligned to what they described as their interests-
but then added that they would vote for Republican Arnold 
Schwarzenegger. They were, concludes Lakoff, voting for identity 
and values more than self-interest. And this trend was observed 
at the national level in the United States. It prompted a new wave 
. of writing about how to frame the debate~ how conservatives had 
largely won the struggle for language in many ways. According 
to Lakoff, prior to Obama's victory, conservatives had effectively 
wielded the old "nation as family, metaphorical toolkit (the world 
is a dangerous place and families need protection. In a difficult 
world, children need help to help them to tell right from wrong). 
The family metaphor came with all the expectations that stern, 
paternal discipline should guide children; that father's authority 
should not be challenged (i.e. strong support must be given to 
presidents in relation to foreign policy etc); and that welfare is 
dangerously akin to maternal indulgence that leads to wayward 
behaviour etc. Underpinning these suggestions is the idea that 
sound, strict morality is what leads to prosperity and security.23 
While history was not always at the forefront of this type of 
analysis, the authority from this kind of language is buttressed by 
the effective wielding of historical examples. In the US context, 
23 George Lakoff, Don't Think of an Elephant Know Your Values and Frame the 
Debate, Carlton: Scribe Publications, 2004. 
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such work follows other commentators who have highlighted 
the effective wielding of rhetoric by former US President Ronald 
Reagan, the "great communicator." Richard Reeves' 2006 study 
of President Reagan argues that his charisma resulted from 
his disregard of the 'nitty-gritty, his strong sense of the world 
historical in his actions, and in his belief that "the speech" was 
the real work. 24 There is strong logic, therefore, to set aside Prime 
Ministers or Presidents or party leaders as a category for special 
attention. in any analysis of their impact in PD. 
Margaret Thatcher, on the rise in 1979, made a speech to her 
Conservative Party in which she invoked Britain's proud history 
as the world leader, in order to re-ignite conservative pride. A 
couple-of snippets serve here as examples: 
The world has never offered us an easy living. There is 
no reason why it should. We have always had to go out 
and earn our living-the hard way. In the past we did not 
hesitate. We had great technical skilt quality, reliability. 
We built well, sold well. \;Ve delivered on tin1e. The world 
bought British and British was best. Not German. Not 
Japanese. British. It was more than that. We knew that to 
keep ahead we had to change. People looked to us as the 
. front runner for the future. 25 
· "Our success," she said, uwas not based on Government hand-outs, 
on protecting yesterday's jobs." And she used this description 
of British work ethic as a basis for sweeping industrial reform 
after she came to power. Ten years later she spoke of Britain's 
special contributions to Europe at war and, without any imperial 
24 Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of the Imagination, New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2006. 
25 Margaret Thatcher, Speech, 12 October 1979, 12 August 2011 <http:// 
www .margaretthatcher .org/ document/ 10414 7>. 
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misgivings, about Europeans' "civilisation" of much of the world 
as ''an extraordinary tale of talent, skill and courage. 1' 26 Today, 
the legacy of the Second World War, especially in Europe, is 
formidable for its capacity to remind people that there is plenty 
of unfinished business; and we can find many other examples 
of European leaders having to tread carefully and deliberately 
around some of the many residual wounds and grievances that 
continue to resonate strongly. 
Politicians have been adept in using history in very public 
ways that have a more reconciliatory purpose? which again, carries 
a more international message easily digested. For example, in 
Germany in 2005, Chancellor Schroder knew how important it was 
to reject a particularly victim-laden interpretation of Germany's 
recent past. On the 60th anniversary of the horrific Allied fire-
bombing of Dresden, he engaged in a very public repudiation of 
neo-Nazi historical revision. This was part of Schroder1s ongoing 
rejection of the calls made by an increasingly popular neo-Nazi 
political party for historical revisionism, in which Germans were 
to be recast as the victims of the Second World War. The NPD 
(National Democratic Party of Germany) had announced plans to 
stage a "funeral march" (Trauermarsch) through the middle of 
Dresden on 13 February 2005 to hijack the sixtieth anniversary of 
the bombing. NPD members of the Saxony state parliament called 
the Dresden raid a "bombing holocaust" (Bombenholocaust) 
and accused the Western Allied "imperialist air-gangsters" who 
conducted the raid war criminals. The key phrase from Schroder's 
statement widely quoted in the (inter)national media was his vow 
"not to allow cause and effect to be reversed," a reference to the 
NPD's version of history in which Germans were cast in the role 
26 Speech in Bruges1 qtd. in Gerard Delanty1 Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, 
Reality, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1995, p. 153. 
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of victims. Chancellor Schroder was an advocate of the idea that 
German nationalism always must be viewed through the prism of 
Auschwitz. In arguing this way, Schroder successfully restored a 
sense of what was cause and what was effect in German history, 
and thereby framed a sense of nation in a modern context. 27 
As another powerful example of a leader's attempt at 
reconciliation that drew on a sense of history, we could also 
consider US President Banick Obama's speech to the Muslim 
world in Cairo in june 2009. This was a prime example of inviting 
listeners to feel that a new beginning towards better times was 
dawning. He achieved this through a combination of confession 
for sins past (for example, the previous US tendency to categorise 
Muslim-majority states as defined according to the Communist 
or Democratic camps during the Cold War); recognition of 
the interconnectedness of American prosperity and Muslim 
contributions; declarations about the universality of fundamental 
human rights, wants, needs; and intellectual and emotional 
generosity in drawing inspiration, at the end of his speech, equally 
from the Koran, the Talmud and the Holy Bible.28 
In Australia too, james Curran (in his book, ThePowerofSpeech) 
has written on Prime Ministers and the ways in which they have 
derived authority through compelling articulations of Australian 
nationalism. Curran argues that since the 1970s it has been very 
\ . 
important for Australian Prime Ministers to speak to Australian 
values and national ideals, not only to win the electorate's support, 
but in order to maintain their positions of authority within their 
27 uBerlin Commemorates Auschwitz Liberation," Deutsche Welle, 2 August 
2011 <http:/ /www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1468497,00.htrnl>. 
28 Barack Obama, Speech, Cairo, New York Times, 4 june 2009, 4 December 
2009 <http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text. 
html?pagewanted"'all>. 
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respective parties, who have come to expect this of them. It did 
not have to be heavily fact-laden history; but it did need to be 
sentient history, felt history about who we imagined we were. 
Those who did it best, argues Curran, were those who were able 
to establish continuity with the present, so that listeners felt that 
they were living out the legacy of what had come before. 29 This 
conclusion, I suggest, applies generally rather than purely to 
Australian circumstances. 
In exploring the significance of history for leaders projecting 
messages that have PD-type qualities, new social media will play an 
important role in reaching broad audiences quickly and provide a 
means for popular levels of engagement with a nation's projections 
and standing in the world. There is something special about the 
way in which Indian authorities blend India's trajectory in world 
. affairs with India's embrace of communications technology. As 
others have said, including Shashi Tharoor, it is most fitting that 
India, an IT powerhouse, makes maximum use of social media 
to infonn the Indian public of India's interests and activities 
in the world. The official sites for Indian public diplomacy also 
emphasize India's booming technology sector and the country's 
largest English-speaking population in the world as jumping 
points for venturing into this mode of diplomacy and as scene-
setting for India's rising international standing.30 More traditional 
publications such as the annual collection of documents, India's 
Foreign Relations, build further the feeling of international take-off 
by detailing India's spectacular economic growth, its technological 
and communications successes and its ongoing efforts to address 
29 )ames Curran, The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the 
National Image, Melbourne: Melbourne UP, 2004. 
30 "Public Diplomacy - India/' 10 August 2011 <http:/ /publicdiplomacy. 
wikia.com/wiki/India>. 
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problems of global dimensions, including the developmental needs 
of other nations, attempts to mitigate climate change and policy 
around the use of energy resources.31 
Amidst what is an admirable air of excitement there is a slightly 
elusive quality about the scope of the Ministry's involvement in\it. In 
saying that upublic diplomacy activities often present many diffedng 
views as represented by private individuals and organizations 
in addition to official Government views and positions"32 there 
is a suggestion of ministerial facilitation of things that then run 
independently, or even ministerial noting other goings on if and 
when the department learns of them. There is not much history 
in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs' PD messages, which are 
arguably directed internally, at Indians, as much as externally, 
and are set to expand with a new, and very logical, focus on Indian 
diasporas overseas. Amidst the social media, the PD Division of 
MEA has a robust set of publications, seminars and conferences, 
distinguished lecture series and visitors program. For historical 
content, there remains something of a gap between the Indian 
Council for Cultural Relations, the programs and activities of which 
are fascinating, and the new wave of PD. 
In significant ways the diplomatic game has changed; but 
in making the case for continued engagement with history I am 
envisaging those publicly-aimed messages that will su~vive when 
specific foreign policies strike trouble. India's early forays in PD 
in the 1940s and 1950s involved an "intermingling" of Indian 
challenges and visions with those of the international order, and 
31 Avtar Singh Bhasin, ed., India's Foreign Relations- 2009 Documents, New 
Delhi: Public Diplomacy Division, MEA and Geetika Publishers, 2010, p. 2. 
32 "Indian Public Diplomacy/' Public Diplomacy D-ivision, Ministry of 
External Affairs, Government of India, 2010-2011, 10 August 2011 
<http:/ /indiandiplomacy.in/ AboutUs.aspx>. 
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however unreachable some of the one worldism, some core ideals 
survived immediate gains and losses in foreign policy stakes. So 
too with Australia's early forays in international education. If 
we do not ask too much of PD today, if we are content with an 
"intermingling" of state and non-state agencies, or the "milieu 
factors" making up the environment that Melissen speaks of, then 
there are some compelling reasons for persisting with it1 and with 
a historical sensibility attached. 
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